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RESTRICTED 
VITAL U.S. COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 
Gentlemen: 
A lecture delivered by 
Professor William Y. Elliott 
at the Naval War College 
September 21, 1949 
The commercial and .economic policy of this cou}try is 
the center from which the goal of war production must be 
nourished. War strategy, for that matter, depends today, more 
than ever, on logistics. Therefore, the health of the American 
economy is a primary concern to you who are vitally , entrusted 
· with the security of this country.
I have been thinking this past week a little bit about how 
to set forth that problem. I have decided' to go back to the relationo 
between politics and economics, at the outset, and develop from 
that angle the chief strategic problems that are presented by the 
economic structure of the country. These naturally have to do, 
first of all, with the total production for war that the country 
can achieve. And that is not a matter of just our own system, 
but the systems on which we draw as well. It's too simple to­
day to make plans in terms of the United States as a single 
economy. In point of fact, that is no longer realistic. We draw on 
the economies of the world for our raw materials. Keeping open 
the seas of the world,_ therefore, becomes a matter of absolutely 
vital concern, more so today than it was· in the past. We naturally 
have to support alli�s in all parts of the world and that too re­
quires· an enormous effort from the point of view of naval opera­
tions, merchant shipping and convoying, and so forth. We can 
not fight an effective war and win it without putting men over-
ProfessQl' Elliott is Professor of Government at Harvard University 
and was the wartime Vice Chairman of WPB. 
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seas under naval shelter and without controlling large areas of 
strategic raw materials supply lines. 
No setting of the American economy, therefore, can be 
an isolationist setting in the very simple terms of considering 
this economy alone. For that reason I want to deal with the com­
mercial and fiscal policies of this country first in the light of the 
foreign undertakings that we have made, such as the commitments 
abroad, the E. C. A. and the arms program supplement to the 
Atlantic Pact, but also what I think is going to be a struggle for 
the backward areas of the world. How much realism is there in the 
present "point four" program of the President's last inaugural 
address, his "bold new program?" How much can we compete with 
communism in the development of backward areas, and with what 
tactics? That is the framework of what I have to talk about and I 
only hope I can cover it in time. 
There is a usual misconception about the relation between 
politics and economics, about which I find I have to clear my own 
thinking. I find it is very deeply rooted in popular misconceptions. 
It is the delusion that material economics governs political action 
and public policy. I want to say at the outset that it is my con­
viction that politics always dominates economics. I'm quite pre­
pared to admit that the instruments of production, as Karl Marx 
pointed out, have a very vital, though not necessarily controlling, 
bearing on all the political and social structures of the world. When 
we shift over from an agrarian economy to a super-industrial econ­
omy, it effects every aspect of human life. But the fact that this 
system, in its handling of the control of the instruments of pro­
duction (I want to emphasize that "control of the instruments of 
production"), their use, their applications to human values, takes an 
entirely opposed and radically different line from the totalitarian 
system with which we are today in conflict-in what is called a 
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''cold war," a "hot peace," or something else. That fact would tend 
to show that the difference in the method by which we apply and 
use the great techniques which modern science and industry have 
furnished us may be very vital and may be indeed, the "two 
worlds" dividing line. If in this system we still rely-and we do, 
thank God-on the initiative of the individual, jf we rely upon what 
is called private enterprise (and· that's a term "of scorn in some 
quarters today) to create individual self reliance, to permit the de­
velopment of character in our citizenship through resp�nsibility,
then all that has a very vital bearing on the whole method of econ­
omic production. No one ought to know that better than someone 
who was engaged in trying to plan it and trying to control it in the 
last war. I did that from June, 1940, on toward the end of the war. 
For a year or so, I had the civilian requirements for the war pro­
duction program. Before that I had the imports, public purchases, 
all the control of civilian aspects of shipping as to what came into 
this country. 
The order by which we administered and through which we 
were able to enforce the very much gr�ater diversion of our re­
sources to war, and a very useful thing to have, was the M-63 
order of the War Production Board, by which we could say to 
any branch chief or industry _division, "You do not get your import­
ed materials unless you conform to certain rules; we are pre­
pared to insist that you put most of this stuff into the war ef­
fort or into the essential w:a;r-supporting effort." A single hold 
like that means that you can supplement or direct the flow of your 
resources in a very important way. It does not. mean that you 
have control over things like manpower, as we found out, of course. 
It does not mean that in a war economy you have all the controls 
that are necessary. The Controlled Material Plan, which was like 
keeping a checking account of what we had, was an essential 
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supplement, as a mechanism, for seeing that vital short ,materials 
went to the right things and not the wrong things. 
So I do not speak in defense of private initiative and· free 
enterprise, etc./ without some knowledge of the necessity in, war­
time, under conditions of shortage, of directing and controlling the 
economy. But what I would like to emphasize at the outset, in order 
to underline the point I have made about the supremacy of poli­
tics over economics, is that, with all that direction, which in the 
last years of the war became fairly complete in the materials field 
and the production field, control was never complete or adequate 
in the manpower field. And even the controls that we had were not 
the dynamics of production. 
The saving point of American production was · precisely 
the fact that people were left free to adjust themselves to new 
conditions, to try new experiments, to improve their own techniques, 
without waiting for orders to come down from Washington. We 
directed, and limited them by material end-use orders, M-orders, 
and control , orders, but we did not try to plan the production of 
an individual factory. We did try to set up targets for produc­
tion and ask them to adhere to them. And I assert that that 
particular method of control proved itself, in practice, to be the 
most efficient method of control that any economy, anywhere, 
has ever accomplished. I believe the record speaks for itself. 
The rapidity with which changes were made and the enlistment 
of· the enthusiasm and the vital energies of people who were do­
ing this through a sense of "it's our job" were the things that 
counted, just as you found it so in fighting forces, I think. And 
I believe that accounts in large measure for the superiority and 
the flexibility of tactical operations of men who are trained to 
take responsibility-where a sergeant can come out, as I've seen 
them come out in the Argonne, commanding a company and still 
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get it out of there-:-where a corporal will take over, if he has 
to, and where a private will operate on his own, 
Now I wanted to emphasize at the outset that this dy".' 
namics of a free system is something that, if we lose, we lose 
the key to a great part of the thing that makes the strength of 
our country all through. Therefore it becomes, of extreme concern 
to us to see most of the rest of the. world going along the other 
line. That is our prime problem. The primacy of PO\;ltics,� 
rest of the world has assumed that planning the whole of an 
economy is the most efficient way to do it. They eliminate 
this drive of the man who feels, "It is my job, my creation, my 
responsibility. Even in the part of big business, I have a right 
to rise in that and come to the top. Even if I am a worker in that 
business I am not cut off from advancement, from starting some­
thing of my own." 
The scale of much modern business, and its operation, de­
mands increasingly technical competence. There is no question 
about that. They demand. abilities o:f a rare quality in manage­
ment. And they demand that we recruit by "the career open to 
the talented", in Napoleon's phrase, as never before. But as long 
as every private has at least a marshall's baton in his knapsack, 
if it doesn't come between his shoulder blades so that it sounds 
like a drum, you have a free system and can do what a free 
system can do. At any time that you superimpose the direction 
on that system from bureaucracy, that bureaucracy becomes more 
and more limited in its responses. It tends to cut off criticism. I 
have felt this way myself many a time. How often did I resent 
the holdup on the Hill and the investigation of something that 
I thought the Congressmen cared and knew far less about than I 
did, and that the consumers had far less right to judge than I 
did. Surely, that is human nature. But it is a very salutary 
thing, nevertheless, in spite of all the weaknesses of our system, 
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to have an accounting, to be able to be brought before the bar of 
representatives who are popularly elected. 
The weakness of our system, if I may say so, in terms of 
this political parenthesis that I'm trying to draw around it, is that 
it does not have sufficiently responsible direction and is too easily 
moved by pressure groups-minorities of a very well organized type 
can often push through unsound, uneconomical policies, and, if 
strategically located in the big states as they are in many instances, 
and in the cities in particular, they have to be bought at a terrific 
price. The electoral college, which the Lodge amendment I hope will 
cure in part if it ever gets through, loads the dice in favor of small 
pressure groups, or highly organized, intense pressure groups. That 
weakness of our political system is something that we must cure 
in order to allow the national interests to be protected. But that's 
another and a large story. 
Now it is against this background that I want to examine 
the problems that lie ahead of us. First of all, I want to examine 
the scope of the economy in the United States in its relation to 
other economies. I don't have to have a map here to try to point 
out to you who know it, I hope, better than anybody in the 
country, the extraordinary dependence of this country upon im­
ports from abroad, and particularly of strategic materials. 
As for stockpiling, I hope some day I'll outlive the nick­
name "Stockpile Bill", but I don't ever want to live down what 
is behind it, because unless we protect ourselves by adequate 
reserves of the extremely critical and strategic, and particularly 
the high-priority strategic material on your lists, we are never 
in a position to use our total resources in the best way. You'll 
still be sending convoys all around the world, dissipating mili­
tary and naval forces to many sections of the world that you 
ought not to have to be burdened with. · But you should have 
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not just one years', not just two years', in my judgment, but 
you should have three or four years', at the minimum, stocks 
of the most critical and strategic materials which we do not have 
in anything like adequate amounts even to carry on a normal effort, 
much less a war effort. That means that we are dependent on 
sea control until we do get such stockpiles or imports from abroad, 
many of which in the last war had to be flown into this country. 
Sometimes we were days not even weeks ah€ad of the production 
schedule on mica, quartz, crystal and steatite talc for condensers. 
I remember the headache it was to get the latter flown from India. 
Now our stockpiling policy has improved, but every time there 
is a chance to cut something, that is where Congress cuts it, and 
they cut it again this year. 
The military budget is an extremely low budget. It doesn't 
have a lot of pressure groups behind it. In this instance, stock­
piles have against them the whole mining block of the West. We 
are not quite in the days that we were with Scrugham and his 
predecessors, chiefly from Nevada, a state which has beautiful 
scenery. It has advantages of other sorts, but has, about, if my 
memory is correct, 100,000 people in it. But it has two very 
highly placed Senators. They always, by seniority, get to be the 
top dogs in all sorts of committees. It has only one Congressman. 
On the basis of equal apportionment, it would be entitled to about 
one-fifth of one congressman, but it, nevertheless, with the aid of 
similar mining states, is the political power behind exploiting our 
domestic resources. Naturally, there is nothing reprehensible about 
this. It is just unfortunate that the national interest should be 
weighted, as I have tried to point out, in terms of this .narrow in­
terest. And you can log-roll copper and zinc, lead and silver, and 
can parlay the whole thing into something staggering. We have 
a silver policy that no reputable economist that I know of has ever 
been willing to defend in this country. Your natural result is to 
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build up an opposition to imports from abroad of materials of the 
most important strategic character and to use the scanty reserves 
that we have in this country. 
Now I urge that that does not mean that we should not de­
velop and explore and have ready and on tap, and even do some 
marginal mining, to keep mines open, to pump them out, so that 
they are at a standby condition, at any rate, in order to use them 
quickly if we have to. But it does definitely mean that we had better 
import and rely on materials abroad and that our commercial pol­
icy should have as a prime consideration, the building of, not just 
the narrowly conceived thin reserves, but long-range reserves. 
What's wrong with the mine above ground in this country 
instead of underground in Rhodesia? When we are giving our re­
sources, as we are giving them, freely, almost throwing them away 
with both hands, a good bargain along those lines would be very 
interesting and useful indeed, and it is one of the bases that I hope 
will be explored in the forthcoming British negotiations. We seem 
to be doomed in those negotiations to keep the British up in a 
style to which they have never previously been accustomed, out 
now which they must be kept in if they are to keep a government 
which is tolerably cooperative. The guaranty that nations used to 
pay to be left alone has taken a new turn in our post-war foreign 
aid. But it would seem reasonable that at some stage of these 
operations that if we are going to make a big gold loan to under­
write the stability of the sterling block, or if we are going to do 
anything of that sort, we should get back the excess production, 
the new . production, the increased production. Congress was able 
to write that sort of provision into the E. C. A. Act as a part of 
the E. C. A. operations, but it has come to almost nothing. Of 
course, if you want to play Santa Claus, you'll never get that kind 
of return. It becomes a matter of critical importance to the future 
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. of this country. I hope you'll never forget this, gentlemen, be­
cause you'll be in a position, in the Army, N_avy, and Munitions 
Board, and other positions of influence, to see that the reserves, 
not merely the thin strategic military reserves, but the long-range 
reserves of strategic materials in this country are built up as high 
as.we can. 
What would be the harm of having ten years' stock of man­
ganese in this country? The steel industry is not going to quit 
using manganese; the oxidation process may decrease its use, and 
I'm hopeful that it will. All measures are good that may be taken 
to relieve the pressure on these short materials by pilot plant 
operations, by substitutes, by the kind of picture that opens up to us 
now in shale oil, by which we really may become less dependent on 
our dwindling natural well petroleum reserves. All those things 
should be explored, and a very important part of national investment 
in our policy ought to be aimed at developing these substitutes. I 
have no means of knowing whether mica spark plugs from East 
Africa are necessary to you gentlemen; you thought so for your 
navy planes, particularly during the war. You told me, and we went 
on that basis, that substitute plugs wouldn't stand up under operat­
ing conditions, that they cracked when they hit the water. You 
were flying the planes and we said, "O. K., we will get that mica," 
and we did. But it meant occupying Madagascar, among other 
things, although the graphite there was equally important. 
Now I'm just trying to point out the picture of the de­
pendence of this country from the point of view of politics, or on 
policy on imports from abroad, unless we have developed a stock­
piling policy of a magnitude that we have heretofore not thought 
of, unless we've got a big thick cushion that will allow us years to 
turn around and change our processes. If we try to change them 
in mid-stream, in war, we run into the most unforeseen difficulties. 
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They were at least unforeseen to some extent last time, but now we 
ought never to claim that excuse. We had to ch�nge over to the 
lime•soda sinter process in aluminum not only for the production 
of planes, but also for all the intricate uses that aluminum has, 
because we dropped very nearly 100 ships in the Caribbean bringing 
in the Dutch and British Guiana bauxite for Aluminum Incorporated 
in Canada, British Guiana, and for Reynolds and Kaiser, and of 
course for the Aluminum Company of America. We could not 
keep up that punishing loss of ships. But what did the change do? 
Valves and compressors ran afoul the escort vessels. When we 
had to make that drastic change in production methods, it threw 
out transportation domestically. We were shipping in gondola type 
cars. I'm just trying to show you what planning involves. You 
must foresee the results of all these actions and if taken without 
preparation, and in a very short period, they tend to disrupt many 
other planned operations, and to introduce new priorities into an 
already inflated priority system. Iri other words, we ought to have 
the maximum development of those things that we can use dom­
estically and we ought to have the maximum protection in strategic 
materials on hand. And there is no earthly reason we shouldn't. 
Instead of trading in the world in gold and burying it in Fort Knox, 
it would be much more intelligent, surely, since no one wants gold 
outside this country apparently, to take strategic materials in lieu of 
gold-strategic minerals, too-they will never lose their value. 
They do not need to be used immediately. Let's sterilize them, too, 
to keep the commercials from worrying about the effect on the 
market. But here there is a permanent source of national wealth 
which the whole history of humanity has shown to be basic. Now 
I'm going to drop that point, but I do want to emphasize it. It is a 
keystone in our commercial policy, or should be. It is of critical 
importance to put a thicker cushion, not a thin one, not a six 
months', a one year's reserve, a year and a half's, but something 
that we can stretch if need be indefinitely. That will give us the 
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full use of our resources in other respects and in maximum efficiency, 
naval military and air, to divert to the main job' of winning a war, 
which is something that we ought to take seriously. It was a 
great grief to me to have to ask for ships .when I knew the Army 
and Navy were short of them; and we tried to avoid that. It
took some very heroic measures, some of which i have tried to 
indicate to you like this change-over in aluminum, but it is a great 
cost which should be awarded generally by planning ahead of time 
where possible. 
Now to get that into our thinking as a key story of com­
mercial policy would effect a great many other things. What have 
been the great keystones of our commercial policy? Let us trace 
them officially and then realistically. Officially, Mr. Hull's policy 
has, on the whole, triumphed. That is a policy based on reciprocal 
bargains for tariffs. It isn'i free-trade. It would be a mistake to 
call it that. It does use one device which tends to make trade very 
much more free, namely the "most favored nation" clause in treaties. 
In other words, if we make an agreement, or if France makes an 
agreement with a .third party, we claim, with our commercial 
treaties with France, the same rights that are accorded to that 
third party in France and we give to France the same rights. 
Today Britain holds, in a curious way, the key to the nat�re of our 
own commercial policy. 
Now the British, as usual, have had a very interesting de­
vice for avoiding "most favored nation" free. trade, a device which 
is called "Imperial Preference."· We rely on the British Com­
monwealth of Natio:rtS as our closest and dearest and most ultimate 
support, particularly �anada, Australia, and the Dominions, but 
nonetheless the United Kingdom in the long run. Naturally the 
British are aware of our dependence and they are not backward 
about taking. advantage of it, if I may say so without being un-
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friendly. They need desperately to be insured, particularly until 
they assure themselves. So that from the point of view of the 
major policies of this country, it has been a matter of critical 
importance not to destroy the sterling block. That is what these 
conversations in Washington are about: To keep the British in a 
position to export enough to support themselves and to keep that 
economy going as far as we are able to do it. That has meant 
that we have accepted the sterling bloc though we might have 
raised serious difficulties, and even broken it down had we chosen, 
or could today in · ten minutes or less. Along with bolstering up 
the nations that tie their currencies to the pound sterling we have 
had to accept the scheme of imperial preference which gives Brit­
ish goods a preferred position in every dominion, even though 
those dominions are in all respects today as independent as they 
wish to be. And we have allowed that to be called "Imperial 
Preference", a family relationship you see, largely because the 
British need it very desperately. They need that tariff protection 
for their exports to survive these post war years. They were 
not able to meet our competition for long years, even between 
the two wars, on equal terms ; they tried; they. failed. We had 
very little problems about selling our exports. They had very 
great problems. 
Now viewed in terms of the classic economics that Britain 
developed in the 19th century, this was a great confession of 
weakness on the part of Britain, was it not? As long as Britain 
Wa!:! well head of the world, which she was, she stole a march of 
40 or 50 years through the industrial revolution. Many of the 
great revolutionary inventions were the inventions of Scotchmen 
and not of Englishmen, and the Scots had been running Britain 
for quite a long time, as the Canadians have in some measure run us. 
They transformed their whole industry by virtue of having cheap 
coal (I underline that if you don't mind) which they could ex-
40 RESTRICTED 
12
Naval War College Review, Vol. 3 [1950], No. 3, Art. 3
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol3/iss3/3
RESTRICTED 
, port as ballast: for· ships. They got almost a free ride for the 
rest of their cargo.·· This built up a merchant marine by quite 
normal processes. They did not require a· tarjff protection. In­
deed they regarded it as a species of original sin, and they at­
tacked it from about the llliddle of the century in a series of very 
sweeping reforms. The repeal of the Corn Laws was one of them;
the repeal of the Navigation Acts was another. They swept out
. the whole of the old protectionists' Ihercantilist system which had
constituted the empire against �hich we had rebelled in this
. . 
country, because we didn't want to be kept as "hewers of wood,
and draw;ers of water." . Up.fortunately the Dominions which had
been relying on this protection and this pref erred position in the
British market, in return of course for giving a sort of monopoly
to British goods on their own, were not equally happy with this
19th century free trade interlude. in Britain.
The Dominions were unable to develop an industry without 
tariff protection, as we thought we were. Hamilton's line in 
this country had been protection of infant industry. It makes 
a good deal of sense to get an industry started. You do have to 
have some kind of pr9tection against the superior competition of 
an outside fully-developed industry. But where are you going to 
draw the line on that? What kind of industries are naturally 
capable of being put on their feet? What kind of industries, in 
short, will grow up and stop being inf ant industries? We never 
have found an inctqstry in this · country which is willing to stop 
being a baby. They always want to continue a tariff protection 
even though they don't need any possible consideration. Take the 
automobile industry in this country. Now that is the strongest 
export industry in the world. They can just run anybody out of 
business with cars. And the same thing is true of automatic 
machinery. We reverse the whole trend of what the British have 
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had by developing the newer types of industrialism by a mass 
market, and I want to underline that feature, too. 
Then after World War I, the British lost their cheap coal 
which had been one of their major advantages; the seams went 
down and down; they employed more men and older men and less 
efficient production; they did not mechanize their mines, and many 
of their seams didn't lend themselves to mechanization. They 
fought two costly wars, including this last one which exhausted 
them in a great many ways, exhausted their ruling classes in 
many ways, far beyond anything that could ever be put on paper. 
Just read the honor rolls of any Oxford or Cambridge College 
t·ommemorating their war dead and look at what was taken out of 
British life. So I'm not trying to write a strictly economic in­
terpretation of this. It was the price of empire. Empires are 
fated throughout history. Take the Roman Empire. Wars killed 
off the old free Romans in the struggle to rule the world as the 
British have killed off a lot of their best men. So all of that should 
be taken into account in tracing the decline of British power. The 
destruction of Britain was very heavy from bombing. No one can 
neglect that. It was estimated that they lost a total of perhaps 
10 % of their effective industrial potential and a much greater 
percentage in its total through housing losses, and so on. 
After the war they came out an exhausted country, hav­
ing lived on short rations, with a backward industry, an industry 
that has not adjusted itself. But it had over years attempted to 
rely upon its tariff-protected markets in the Dominions, in India 
and elsewhere, on advantageous terms against outside competi­
tion, or a domestic tariff protection that in 1931 outdid anything 
we ever thought of in the Smoot-Hawley Tariff. If we flogged 
them with whips, they flogged back with scorpions. Britain raised 
its tariffs sometimes to 100% by the end of 1932. Since then, 
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Britain has been a very high tariff protection country-acknowledg­
ing its def eat, the passing of its pre-eminence in its exporting 
production on competitive terms-building .. up .sheltered industries
which were largely concerned with supplying the· British domestic 
market. Now that was a first class tragedy, and I don't profess 
to know how that could have been avoided. In the main it re­
sulted from high cost British production. Perhaps if the timing of 
our own tariff policy could have been different, perh_aps if Hit:'. 
ler had not appeared over the horizon, perhaps if we had wisdom 
beyond anything we could have been expected to have during the 
twenties and thirties, this change in basic British policy need not 
have happened. But there may be some law in civilization­
sometimes I'm dreadfully pessimistic about this, but I think there 
is-that when people have lived softly for a considerable period 
of time and have been "top dogs'�, even though they may go 
through the motions, as the British certainly do, of maintaining, . 
a fine code of fair play and the thing that you get in public school 
or college; the "gimp" goes out of them. They haven't had to 
struggle enough for what they get. They are like the sons of a 
rich man from whfrn something has disappeared, something that's 
bred of gang warfare, something that's bred by survival. I hope 
that is not a true picture of history, but it often occurs to me that it 
may be personal and individual as well as national. You shelter 
your children too much and see what happens to them! And the 
whole world· we are living in today demands a degree of realism, 
a degree of toughness, not offensiveness but just steel, that is 
testing nations as well as men. 
Now this passing of the pre-eminence of the British, has 
thrust on us at the end of this war an entirely unlooked-for bur­
den, unprepared-for burden. We should have foreseen it, but 
people never foresee things. We never learn anything except 
through the most painful experience. That is. just human nature. 
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We suddenly had to substitute for Britain as the world's banker, 
as the world's clearing house, as the world's center of trade and 
production. We had over half the industrial production of the 
world at the end of the war and I suspect we still have pretty 
close to that percentage. I am not talking about the total of cill
production, just industrial. We had this tremendous capacity that 
had been created in mass production, large scale markets, which 
effects everything. It effects research; it effects economies and 
management. Sometimes when you consider our anti-trust policy 
you ought to think very seriously of what would really happen if we 
did succeed in unscrambling all the big business in this country. 
We would become, very shortly, a very different figure in world 
power. 
Now to control those big businesses is extremely essential, 
but to unscramble them and to do what so many of our bright 
boys who have a slight leaning toward Moscow would like to do, 
would be disastrous. We must confront the fact that if you did take 
those great units that put thirty or forty million dollars into re­
search a year and scramble them up into little ones, how much 
would be put into research a year? You would do something 
very important to this country and very disastrous in the point of 
view of its power. I'm not going to name names or draw pictures, 
but that has to be thought of! To control big business units, to 
keep them under control in terms of seeing that they do not ex­
ercise the powers of monopoly in politics, and that they are kept 
to the honest job of production and pricing on the basis that 
they should do, is another matter and requires perhaps a different 
technique. It may, in my judgment, require government participa­
tion through public trustees who are in the position to open up every 
book and learn what is being done and reveal everything that is be­
ing done. I'm not sure that government participation in terms of 
share-owning might not be absolutely essential in all the public 
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utilities anyway, but I wouldn't want to turn them all under to be 
run by a state controlled, socialized, bure3:ucratic body. I tried to 
run 1500 people in that way. That is not a very large amount; you 
can run thousands or more in your own shows. But it is enough; 
it is a big headache. And when you try to get rid of the deadwood 
in a bureaucracy just see how much· luck you have! Well, I did. 
· I pared my office down to about one-third its former size, and it
worked very much better, but I couldn't have done it in peacetime.
And when I got to that point, I had to stop paring, because I would
have pared the gizzard out of it and leave a lot of deadwood because
of Civil Service. That is a fact.
In other words, if you are thinking about socializing, con- 
sider. well the instrument of socializing, the nature of the problem, 
the fact that in order to operate you have to protect ev�ry flank­
rear, center, and' everythi:p.g else-and still you don't get any­
where. You are wrapped up in so many layers of red tape and in 
the battle of political pres,sures that by and large your freedom to 
initiate, to improvise, to create, to do something, is frittered away 
in the battle of memoranda. That is a heart-felt confession for one 
of my temperament, my academic profession, for you never saw 
an academic fell ow yet who didn't want to get a tied-in, neat, 
wrapped-up package that would make sense in terms of a logical 
arrangement! But bureaucratic planning looks better on paper 
than in practice. 
It· looks like it makes sense to pool everything and have one 
state of control for the whole business. That is what seduced 
soft minds about the delusion of communism. They think this total 
planning makes sense. This is the way to get things like a solar 
system. I'm sure my astronomer friend Harlow Shapley, who 
wants to build a peace bridge for the Russians, must feel this 
way about "social planning", "scientific planning". He uses his 
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view quite usefully sometimes, from their point of" view. He is as 
good an American as I am ; I'm convinced of that. He is no com­
munist. I don't think he is, in the proper sense, a fellow traveler, 
although he gets used so much in Russian inspired "peace move­
ments" today that it is hard to distinguish. I am sure that he, 
fundamentally, isn't. He is just seduced. The heaven that he star­
gazes at looks like order. Maybe he looks at a picture of the 
planned system controlled by the Kremlin and that looks like order, 
too. But underneath that "order", if anyone looks closer; there 
are, at least 12,000,000 political prisoners enslaved to create that 
order. The whole Moscow system is a seething kind of caldron of 
intrigue and conspiracy and of purges. You have only got to 
read Kravchenko's very honest account to see what the picture 
is like. It is a funny kind of order, but it looks like an order that 
makes sense, if you just get a central control thing. Communism 
promises that when society has all been purged of capitalism by 
it's dictatorship of the proletariat, the societies can be turned 
loose. As a matter of fact, societies and nations that fall under 
communist sway are never turned loose. You've heard about 
Lysenko and you know that biology had to be rewritten in the 
Soviet Union to fit the party line. So has art, music and everything 
else. And you would think that these unhappy intellectuals in our 
country would begin to understand that this Russian party line 
thought-control is the slavery that they are most afraid of, whereas 
we have given them an unparallel freedom-a freedom which they 
have not lived up to, which they frequently abuse in this country. 
But· alas, it is the nature of the beast that he always thinks that 
far hills are greener. Now I introduced that because I think it 
has a very important bearing on our. commercial and economic 
policy. 
The trend toward planning all the details on economy is a 
very seductive trend to bureaucratic, to intellectuals, to people who 
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think that to make sense out of it is to-get everything in a pack­
age and to put it under a single pattern and to blueprint it and 
there it is. That isn't the way things are actually done, though 
there are some things that you have to do that way . 
When you can control all the factors in an equation, that 
is right enough. But in order to do this total planning you really 
must control all the factors in th.e equation and that means con­
trolling what people think, what they are educated in, their res­
ponses. Of course,-you must condition them Ulre animals in Pav­
lov's laboratory, or condition their reflexes. You must malte them 
respond and keep them completely. cut ·off from all outside poison, 
dangerous ideas, any ideas, except those of the party-line "agita­
tion" that plays on emotions, and propaganda that is fed to them 
at all stages. 
Now that might be a very .attractive road. For some people 
it is. It would seem to solve a great many problems, commercially, 
economically and otherwise, if . we could plan imports arid our ex-: 
ports just the way Russia does, to have them all bought through 
a single state trading trust, plan them out in production through a 
single state trade trust, plan them out in production through a series 
of trusts who are making their deals with each other but who are all 
on the Goss .Plan. Unh'appily, Vossnoshensky, the head of Moscow's 
previous plans, seems to have been eliminated as head of the "Goss 
Plan.'' He didn!t quite make the grade. Vargas, their leading 
economic expert, and a great man from the point of view of the 
Russian Academy, had to recant all his honest doctrines and come 
up with some new ones to fit the party line. And the great difficulty 
about this system is precisely that to get real rulers you can hard­
ly ever succeed if you spiritually castrate people and expect them 
just to obey or turn them into Janizaries, like those of the old 
.Turkish empire. You can get admirable robots or automata, but 
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you can't get men with alert critical minds ready to meet new situ�­
tions. Stich rulers are' going to begin to behave according to,JL 
stupid pattern because they have been conditioned, not trained 
to think. And I think we have had plentiful evidence. of that. Jf
you had been playing the Russian line after this war, would you 
have made the incredible mistakes that the Politburo and the 
Kremlin have? You might have had the world on a silver platter if 
your manners had been good. Roosevelt had dished it all out. to 
them. It was theirs for the taking. All that they had to do was to 
avoid showing this offensive, aggressive and uproarious kind of 
condemnation of all the outside world that Mr. Vishinsky and Molo­
tov have treated us to ever since and that Stalin has underlined from 
his base back home. 
If they had chosen to do it, they need not have provoked 
the Marshall Plan. All they had to do to kill the Marshall Plan was 
to . come in on it! It is natural, I think, that the rulers who are 
educated and chosen this way have a stupid set of responses, and 
I think these are the party line responses. They are the victims 
of their own lines and of their own method of propaganda. They get 
it back. in Intelligence quite often, although they have excellent 
Intelligence, if they could use and interpret it correctly, since they 
know what is going on everywhere. Their fifth column seeps 
through and permeates very unpleasantly-things that we are be­
ginning to find out now, and we have pretty definite evidence of it, 
high up and low down. But to interpret Intelligence is the whole 
business, isn't it, in order to use it? What do you do with it? If it 
is "agin" the party line, it ain't so ! Therefore it is very dangerous 
to put back into circulation to Moscow, facts that would not square 
with fixed· party-line expectations. 
So I say that the test of the conflicts of these systems is, 
ultimately,· what they do to the human beings in them. And of all 
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the confused and bewildered people, as we frequently are, we can 
at least try to see daylight in·our own way. The sum total of our 
free system, for all its defects, is considerably more effective, as 
far as one can see short of atomic destruction by surprise, in 
reviving the rest of the world and making a go of it in spite of 
all the weaknesses. 
Now we have staked very desperately on creating a world 
that will not be out of balance, where there won't be a free or­
der, That is our whole commercial economic policy, dictated by 
our political policy and by high strategy. This is a conclusion com­
ing from observations as Staff Director for the Hester Committee 
and the Foreign Affairs Committee during these critical times, and 
consultant for writing the European part of the Post War Econ­
omic Policy and Planning (the Colmer) Committee in the House 
in 1945. No one can tell me that the E. C. A. Program would 
ever have gone through Congress on any other basis than that 
as a buffer against Communism. Would it? Certainly not. Not 
in the magnitude that it did go through. But the Congressmen 
could see one very simple thing. They could see well enough that 
if we left Europe in the powerless state, the economic and politi­
cal vacuum that it was at that time with the Communist parties 
making gains in the elections and with the rations dropping be­
low the subsistence level in a great many European countries after 
the droughts of 1946-47, that we might well lose the war, the peace 
and everything else. And painful as it was they went down in 
Uncle Sam's pocket and dished out five billion plus for the E. C. A., 
and some odd sums here and there of other sorts. And they will 
continue to do it, probably, in spite of a great to-do about diminish­
ing the amounts. But, if you total all foreign aid and military pro­
grams, the sum total will not be very far from half our annual 
Federal Budget if we add the one billion three, which Congress now 
seems to be in a frame of mind to put in for the arms program, and 
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which is absolutely essential to make any sense of the whole thing. 
Add this to what they have voted on the E. C. A. program and 
they will, in effect, have just about balanced up somewhere over 
five billion dollars for foreign aid, alone. If you add Japan onto it 
and our other commitments, it wHl just about tally out. Five billion 
dollars out of a national income like ours, which may run to two 
hundred fifty billions today, is not an excessive percentage, but 
it is a right large sum of money. It represents tremendous amounts 
of natural resources, and of the use of man power, and of commit­
ments in taxation, and all sorts of other things. 
Now we have had to do that because just free-trade, just 
Hull's reciprocal trade agreements, could never in the world have 
pulled us out of this business. They didn't fit the world that we 
were living in. And the I. T. 0., the International Trade Organiza­
tion in which this international freer trade charter at Geneva and 
then Havana has been worked out, is before Congress and looks as 
if it might go through. This would attempt to anchor Hull's pol­
icies and to make them universal in the world outside the Rus­
sian satellite block. But it is a program that will have no real 
meaning in practice in the world we are living in for several years, 
or at the minimum, ten years, maybe more, maybe never. I think 
it is important; I think it is useful to do although I think that we 
have tied our hands, perhaps excessively, in some of the com­
promises negotiated and that there are details of it where we were 
just plain out-bargained. But when you go into a conference, you 
have to depend upon the people that you have got, and if you don't 
breed tough bargainers anymore, and if you are in the hands of 
boys who think the success of a conference is to be measured- Ill 
terms of everybody going home feeling good, then concession for the 
mere sake of conciliation is the natural outcome. 
The renewal of the reciprocal trade agreements is en-
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couraging. We certainly must accept more goods from abroad if 
we are ever to be repaid anything. We never can be repaid in the 
staggering sums of money we put into len{l-lease, 50 billion dollars, 
during the war. We never can be repaid, I think, by the kind of 
Europe that I am looking at today. The loans that we made�post •  war surplus property-were just given to them. _In effect, we took 
blocked currencies, but who is ever going to UI!:block those cur­
rencies? We don't even get the right to send out students and 
professors abroad without clearing them with forejgn govern­
ment to suit their needs, not outs.' The Fullbright_ Act which is
supposed to do that has been so mismanaged that now the other 
countries determine whether I go over there as a research professor, 
not my country. That is a fact. You wouldn't believe it possible 
but that one little item is all that has resulted in getting a few mil­
lions of dollars for educational purposes abroad back out of all these 
billions. It has. really come down to something not unlike that. The 
selections of the ,ru.Ubright people this year came just this month 
(September) after these boys had to make up their minds to stay 
on at their· colleges or not. They couldn't book passage so late, so 
some just said, "No thank you, we'll stay home." But I'm an in­
terested party here. I see it from the point of view of scholars, 
of students who might be very useful to us abroad in various 
ways. And it is impossible for us to select them. We have actually 
let that get out of our hands in our settlements under the Full­
bright Act. 
Well I say we are not going to collect that. If we collected 
all the Fullbright funds, maybe we would collect perhaps $100,000,-
000 or so, out of the four or five billions,. the minimum of sur­
plus property, the loans that we made or the post war lend­
lease, the continuation of lend-,lease, the three billion seven hundred 
and fifty millions that we gave to Britain to try to stabilize them be­
fore we putin the lend-lease, out of all of this tremendous program 
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on the back of UNRA, into which we put, roughly speaking, 
nearly three billion dollars. That is a right tidy sum! It amounts, 
according to the best calculations I have at this time, in post-war 
additions to the fifty millions of lend-lease, to pretty close to twenty­
six or twenty-seven billion dollars total. That is not chicken feed, 
even in a country like ours. 
Now it has had advantages. There is no question at all that 
this export has enabled us to continue a high level of prosperity 
in this country. We could have done it by giving it away at home, 
and that has been strongly suggested by the people who would like 
to pursue that method in what is miscalled the "Welfare State." But 
we did it abroad on the grounds that we were stabilizing the world. 
Now let us look at these recent conversations of the Brit­
ish. They have been the testing point, in my mind, and they are 
not through. This is just the first round in determining what kind 
of world we are really getting out of all this. Very little has been 
done so far by these countries to put themselves permanently on a 
competitive basis that will enable them to sell in dollar markets, 
and that is what they have got to do. The dollar shortage that 
looks them in the face is appalling and has hardly been honestly 
faced. I don't want to brag, but if you go back and read the Hes­
ter reports, that is those of the Select Committee on Foreign Aid, 
and look at those tables and graphs and the comments on the first 
proposals of the 0. E. E. C., you will see that that committee alone 
called the trick correctly. It showed that without full German pro­
duction and European integration as an economy, the dollar gap 
would remain very large by 1950. But of course nobody paid any at­
tention to that report in the working out of E. C. A. policy. Ger­
many's industries went on being dismantled and Britain turned its 
back, in fact, on getting a real integration of Western Europe in 
order to maintain its own national and imperial yearning under 
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socialism in one state. It was just another �ongressional document, 
and it was drawn up tentatively. And after all, the Harriman Com­
mittee had gone over the same ground and the Krug Committee had .  .  
gone over it; and everybody else had gone over it. The best anyone 
could hope was that the Marshall Plan countries would wind up 
about a billion short in 1952,- which they thought the world bank 
could handle in terms of a dollar shortage. That was the original 
estimate, slightly over a billion. It looked nearer three billion 
(and it even might be four billion)· to us, because the things that 
they were asking and projecting to do was imJ)ossible ! They 
could not increase the exports of Britain f by - l'.75 or .even by 150
per cent in volume. Who was going to buy them? Who could pay 
for them? Whererwere these exports going to be sold, particularly 
in dollar markets with British goods in some cases 100% above 
our own in goods and costs? The West Indies sent a little list. They 
said, "What are we going to do? We like to buy British goods, 
but not at 100% more in price!" When even ship-building gets 
to be more expensive in England than ship-building in New Jer­
sey, that is a scandal. And-this was a selected item. I wish I had 
time to develop what seemed to me to be the reasons behind this 
British business decline� But· the same thing that is true of Brit­
ain is also true in a lesser degree of France. Both can be helped 
temporarily by devaluation. That is what they have done, because 
the British then have a way of scaling down wages among other 
things, at domestic cost, except where the import prices rise com­
mensurately. Their costs may rise from five to ten per cent, 
whereas they get the temporary advantage of selling at a pound 
that is now $2.80, not $4.00. They will be lucky if they can hold 
that, but I hope they can. That is 30% devaluation. 
What happens if they don't hold it? What happens if they 
inflate in England? They have had a concealed inflation for a long, 
long time, very well concealed by the efficiency of their price con-
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trol mechanism, and the fact that they control all their imports. 
They did a lot better job of controlling imports than I did last 
time. I just controlled a minimum part, but a very important part, 
of our production. The imports of Britain control pretty nearly 
anything they want, since so much of all British production is tied 
to imports. 
What happens if they do not increase the efficiency of their 
labor, or alternatively work longer hours? They are right back 
where they started. And no taking down of tariffs, even if we 
removed every tariff in the country, would cure that problem. They 
must cure it themselves. Whether they are capable of curing it 
through the education of the trade unions, I don't know. They 
have come a long way, but their philosophy has, in the process, 
hardened into one of austerity and sacrifice and limitation, instead 
of production. And in that simple formula I think you can express 
the difficulties that Britain is having and will have until they can 
unleash the incentives that a man has in this simple way: If his 
wife wants a washing machine and if he works a little harder or 
better, he can get it. Now that seems a very small matter, but it 
is almost the secret of the American system. You know you can't 
do much about increasing your own productivity because you and I 
are on salaries. But I come running down here to do what little I 
can about it. It is human nature. You will work harder if you can 
get something for it. You won't work harder if two-thirds of all 
your rationed food is subsidized up to fifty per cent by the aid of 
Uncle Sam. That is what is true today, or thereabouts-not quite. 
If your housing is kept on a subsidized basis and you are putting 
your capital investment into that, if you are given false teeth, a 
wig, spectacles, if you line up long enough for the doctor to get 
around to it, and for the production of spectacles, etc., to catch up 
with the demand, all that is a public expense. Maybe it is a welfare 
state. It certainly isn't Moscow; it doesn't look toward Moscow, 
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immediately. But see what happens if you carry on that welfare 
state, and get people in a position where they expect to te sup­
ported in this way, and somebody comes in that promis�s that he 
will give them all that, and more too. He won't be named BEVIN, 
probably, but he might be named BEV AN. And when' he does give 
it to them or tries to give it to them, he wants to control· them 
sure enough! The directed labor that hasn't really been put into 
effect in England would have to be put in. He would have to crack 
down, and when you get that kind of an apparatus, you've got 
something quite different from the democratic. soc�alism of Brit­
ain today and the perfectly constitutional kind of labor party that, 
t!lank God, is still running Britain . .-.· 
So we have to help these fellows, if we can, to help them­
selves: But they make it. awfully hard for us,·· and the more wehelp them without demanding any conditions, the harder it- gets. 
And if we demand any conditions, why that is imperialism, that is 
meddling. You are, more or less, damned if you do and damned if 
you don't. That is the unfortunate position of the benefactor. Re­
member we no longer even talk of "loans" ; everything is a "grant." 
Now how different is this picture from the one that we 
looked at when Britain was growing up! Britain's export of capi­
tal abroad was in the form of loans, not gifts. She rode out a rather 
�omf ortable and easy living· throughout the later nineteenth cen­
tury and part of the twentieth on the basis of those loans. Well, 
until 1938 her balance wasn't really unfavorable because she was 
getting back---:-what doe& the Board of Trade figure-two hundred 
eiihty-five m.illion .pounds a year from the incoll\e on those invest­
ments abroad. Sile had about three billion and a half pounds in 
foreign investments, roughly. speaking----pounds, not dollars. 
ltemember that. Multiply by four or five, now: by two point eight, 
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but not then. That is a tidy sum for a population of forty-five mil­
lion people. They were cushioned by their previous investments. 
We are not building up any such fat for our old age. In­
vestments abroad that can be collected are very very scanty in­
deed. Maybe that will protect us against the kind of fate that hap­
pens to fat people in their old age. Maybe this will keep us lean and 
working for somebody else! It may be the best thing that ever hap­
pened for us. You can take that line but it's a little difficult to 
sell to Congress. But, in the meantime, we are desperately staking 
on trying to get Europe to unite-first, militarily; second, econ­
omically, if we can. That is very important, because neither Brit­
ain, nor France, nor any other European country, even Germany, 
the truncated Germany that we have today which has the great­
est industrial potentials in Europe, is capable of supporting itself 
and its population as an isolated unit. It would be folly to allow 
Europe to build up sixteen national sovereignties. I hope you 
aren't letting them do it in the arms program. If you are, you 
are just dishing out money. You are not building a real arms pro­
gram of European security if you allow them to build up separate 
arms programs, separate weapon types, not to keep the heavy stuff 
here where its production is relatively safe and we can always hold 
it. I hope you aren't, but you probably are! 
We must desperately try to make conditions for our own and 
Europe's future health, if we are to continue this foreign aid that 
will create the advantage of a large scale market. Europe then 
should become a united, even a federated, business, in a loose way, 
with a common currency, with a common hold above all. France, for 
instance, is never going to amount to the great world-shaking power 
that France loves to live on in dreams of the past. The French 
people are well aware of it. But France can be a leading factor in 
modern Europe, with two hundred fifty million people, with all the 
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colonies of Europe. And still there remain the colonies in Africa, at 
least, because they are not fit to be self-governing and anybody who 
tells you so has a party line to Moscow or is talking nonsense. You 
can't turn Africa even into a low-grade local Tammany Hall. 
That is the closest thing I can get to it. All that ki:g.d 8f an area, 
with its natural resources of the world, ought to b� a third power in 
the world that we must create if we are ever to get out of this un­
fortunate condition with Russia, which we alone a.re holding. And 
we have to stake very desperately. So far we have assured Stalin 
by our acts that we are "green" and poor bargainers. 
We have had nationalism to deal with, and can't handle it. 
Stalin thinks he can and has. Maybe it couldn't have been done any 
other way. We haven't m:ade very great progress, but even in the 
limited time that our commercial and economic policy has been in 
effect, we have certainly seen the world turn the corner. The 
communists have never won an election victory in a free country 
since the E. C. A. went into effect. They have lost ground, terrifical­
ly, in free elections. They have lost it in Germany; lost it in France; 
lost it in Italy. And that alone was probably worth the E. C. A. 
But these gains must be held ; must be turned into something per­
manent to get these fellows off relief and on their own. Our play is 
certainly turning out well, to some degree, in the west. And the 
Atlantic Pact is turning into something that goes beyond that. 
For Western Europe, Britain is not enough. The Sterling block is 
not enough. All Western Europe has to be a unit, if it is to sur­
vive against the colossus of Russia. And it can survive once that 
kind of force is created in the world, if it can be. I'm not unaware 
o;f the difficulties in this problem. I've studied them very closely, 
been on the spot in every country there, talked with their taxi 
drivers, workers and. farmers, as well as their statesmen. I know 
what an heroic job this is. But if we are going to underwrite this 
world aid indefinitely, haven't we a right to propose to them that 
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they meet the conditions that will some day lift them out of this 
morass, and that they shan't perpetuate something which con­
tinues this incredible kind of situation, where they depend upon 
our bounty from year to year as to whether they will continue to 
exist or not? The sooner we face that, the sooner we make them 
face it, the sooner our commercial policy will make sense. 
I wouldn't try to take away from them the rights of dis­
crimination against this country, even. I think they will have to 
keep such tariff protection. But I would certainly take away the 
right to discriminate with each other. I hope I make that clear. 
That to me is the cardinal point in our policy at this stage. I 
think that we have not made it very vigorously, but we have 
learned a great lesson. The devaluation of the pound was some­
thing of a triumph from the point of view of realism. It is going 
to be very hard for the British Labor Party to support it. We 
ought to be sympathetic with them. In that way there are some 
signs that we are coming of age. There are signs that our leaders 
are beginning to understand and to assume the role of people 
who have to see that what we do is not thrown away, that all these 
efforts, and they are very great efforts, come. to some fulfillment. 
This must be a fulfillment not just in terms of our own advantage, 
because it never will be just that, but a fulfillment in the sense that 
we have a world that we can live in, and breath in, and in which 
free men can once more face the future with some assurance. 
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This section lists material published in current periodicals which 
will be of interest and value to Navy officers. 
"Secret Photos-Russian War Maneuvers" 
by Garrett Underhill. Colliers. January 28, 1950. 
"Six Satellites and an Octopus" 
by Dr. Nicholas Nyaradi. The Reporter. January 31, 1950. 
"Russia's Grip on China." 
U.S. News and World Report. January 27, 1950. 
"To Prevent War" 
by Bernard Baruch. Reader's Digest. February. 
t•w hat Can We Expect of Europe?" 
by James Burnham. The American Mercury. February. 
"Our Worst Blunders in the War - Japan and the Russians"
by Hanson Baldwin. The Atlantic. February. 
ttAir Force on Russia's Border" 
by T. V. Graves. Flying. February. 
"Formosa--Hot Spot of the Bast" 
by Frederick G. Vosburgh. The National Geographic Magazine. February. 
t1The Missing Key to U. S. Policy" 
by Michael A. Heilperin. 
"Two Geostrategic Maps" 
(illustrated) Fortune. February. 
''Harmony in the Armed Services-An Exclusive Interview 
with General Eisenhower" 
U. S. News and World Report. February 3, 1950. 
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"Science and Politics in the 20th Century" 
by James B. Conant. 
"Tito: A Study" 
Foreign Affairs. January. 
"Strategic Implications of the North Atlantic Pact" 
by Bernard Brodie. Yale Review. Winter, 1950. 
"World Policy Makers Discottnt War" 
(an Editorial) United Nations World. February. 
"Biological Warfare-The Equalizer" 
by Lt. James B. Kelley, USNR. 
"Jarvis: Destroyer That Vanished" 
by Cdr. James C. Shaw, USN. U. S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings. February. 
"The Hydrogen Bomb: Strategy of Despair" 
New "'8.epublic. February 13, 1950. 
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